Established 1946 · Heavy Electrical Equipment

Bharat Bijlee Ltd

BSE 503960NSE BBLStandaloneScreener pagebharatbijlee.com
₹2,374+0.26%
Market Cap
2,666
Current Price
2,359.00
52-Week High
3,411.00
52-Week Low
2,009.00
Stock P/E
23.80x
Book Value
1,795.00
Dividend Yield
1.5%
ROCE
8.4%
ROE
6.0%
Face Value
5.00
The business

What the company does

Established in 1946, Bharat Bijlee is a leading electrical engineering company in India engaged in manufacturing of transformers, electric motors, elevator systems, drives and automation. It also provides turnkey solutions for EHV switchyards, HV and MV substations, Electrical Balance of Plant, etc.

Screener checklist

Pros

  • Company has been maintaining a healthy dividend payout of 30.9%

Cons

  • Promoter holding is low: 33.6%
  • Company has a low return on equity of 6.95% over last 3 years.

Pros / cons are machine generated by Screener from a checklist to highlight important points. Exercise caution and do your own analysis.

01 / Quarters

Quarterly Results

Rs. Crores · last 13 quarters

Every line expands. Hit the + beside any row for the arithmetic that builds it, its trend across the whole table, and the shape of the series. Click anywhere else on a row to mark it in amber while you talk. Keyboard: E expands everything, C collapses it.

Rs. CroresJun 2023Sep 2023Dec 2023Mar 2024Jun 2024Sep 2024Dec 2024Mar 2025Jun 2025Sep 2025Dec 2025Mar 2026Jun 2026
Sales441420424587375394514619465473568767547
Expenses409381385526345372461556431439534712518
Operating Profit33383962292253633435345529
OPM %7.0%9.0%9.0%11.0%8.0%6.0%10.0%10.0%7.0%7.0%6.0%7.0%5.0%
Other Income10710121011913101291011
Interest5555333424568
Depreciation3345555555566
Profit before tax33374064322554683737335226
Tax %24.0%24.0%25.0%24.0%25.0%26.0%25.0%26.0%25.0%25.0%26.0%25.0%25.0%
Net Profit25283049241941502828253920
EPS in Rs22.4224.6826.2742.9521.1716.6235.9444.5124.6724.9821.8334.7717.37

Q1 FY27 (Jun 2026): revenue ₹547 Cr against ₹465 Cr a year earlier, but net profit fell to ₹20 Cr from ₹28 Cr. Expand Profit before tax to see exactly where it went.

02 / Income

Profit & Loss

Rs. Crores · FY2015–FY2026 + TTM
Rs. CroresMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026TTM
Sales6106386777749329297311,2661,4181,8721,9022,2742,356
Expenses6286186587378728586921,1791,2991,6981,7302,1112,203
Operating Profit(18)20203761703987120175171163153
OPM %(3.0%)3.1%2.9%4.8%7.0%8.0%5.0%7.0%8.0%9.0%9.0%7.0%6.0%
Other Income18212768293027242938434142
Interest23231923202319242423162223
Depreciation12101098910121315192223
Profit before tax(34)7187362693775111174179160149
Tax %(1.0%)2.0%20.0%16.0%33.0%34.0%29.0%25.0%25.0%24.0%25.0%25.0%–
Net Profit(34)714614246265683131134120112
EPS in Rs(30.13)6.3612.7653.9636.7540.3723.0549.1973.65116.32118.24106.2598.95
Dividend Payout %0.0%0.0%0.0%2.0%17.0%15.0%11.0%30.0%27.0%30.0%30.0%33.0%–

Compounded Sales Growth

10 Years
14.0%
5 Years
25.0%
3 Years
17.0%
TTM
18.0%

Compounded Profit Growth

10 Years
33.0%
5 Years
37.0%
3 Years
13.0%
TTM
(19.0%)

Stock Price CAGR

10 Years
20.0%
5 Years
30.0%
3 Years
4.0%
1 Year
(21.0%)

Return on Equity

10 Years
6.0%
5 Years
7.0%
3 Years
7.0%
Last Year
6.0%
03 / Position

Balance Sheet

Rs. Crores · FY2015–FY2026
Rs. CroresMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026
Equity & Liabilities
Equity Capital666666666666
Reserves2602676466867467509671,1181,3721,8591,9362,023
Borrowings13316917821519924823827928715080301
Other Liabilities201201213208197237266258386490601782
Total Liabilities5996421,0421,1141,1481,2401,4761,6602,0522,5052,6223,112
Assets
Fixed Assets847772656974102105108130129145
CWIP111782433231483
Investments883523473763535616738901,3241,3411,357
Other Assets5075566186936957908108781,0511,0481,1381,528
Total Assets5996421,0421,1141,1481,2401,4761,6602,0522,5052,6223,112

Expand Total Assets to watch the four components add up, then expand Other Assets — it grew ₹390 Cr in FY2026, the same hole that shows up in operating cash flow.

04 / Cash

Cash Flow

Rs. Crores · FY2015–FY2026
Rs. CroresMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026
Cash from Operating Activity(41)(5)13(53)531239(9)52241175(92)
Cash from Investing Activity10(11)626(20)(22)(13)(14)(10)(52)(54)(82)
Cash from Financing Activity3114(7)18(34)10(20)17(31)(182)(123)163
Net Cash Flow0(2)12(10)(1)16(6)117(2)(12)
Free Cash Flow(43)(9)9(14)39(15)22(26)36209141(206)
CFO / Operating Profit223.0%(30.0%)44.0%(104.0%)112.0%36.0%115.0%10.0%65.0%162.0%129.0%(31.0%)

FY2026 reads −31% on cash conversion, with operating cash flow at −₹92 Cr and free cash flow at −₹206 Cr, funded by ₹163 Cr of financing inflow. Expand Net Cash Flow to show the three flows resolving.

05 / Efficiency

Ratios

Days & percentages · FY2015–FY2026
RatioMar 2015Mar 2016Mar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026
Debtor Days1271281201401001151209999747293
Inventory Days6880917481114190861167482107
Days Payable11511411510384961335471597079
Cash Conversion Cycle809497111981331781301458985120
Working Capital Days19114587949913842100303626
ROCE %(3.0%)7.0%6.0%6.0%9.0%9.0%5.0%8.0%9.0%11.0%10.0%8.0%

The cycle tightened to 85 days in FY2025 and widened back to 120 in FY2026 — the same story the cash flow statement tells.

06 / Ownership

Shareholding Pattern

Percentages
QuarterlySep 2023Dec 2023Mar 2024Jun 2024Sep 2024Dec 2024Mar 2025Jun 2025Sep 2025Dec 2025Mar 2026Jun 2026
Promoters33.9%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%
FIIs2.1%2.1%2.3%3.6%4.8%5.3%3.8%3.6%3.7%3.6%4.1%5.8%
DIIs5.7%7.8%9.2%12.7%16.3%17.8%17.3%18.0%18.4%17.6%17.9%15.6%
Public58.4%56.3%54.8%50.0%45.2%43.3%45.2%44.8%44.3%45.1%44.3%44.9%
No. of Shareholders34,47936,69839,72350,79053,43339,23343,51845,47343,30043,49142,60241,365
YearlyMar 2017Mar 2018Mar 2019Mar 2020Mar 2021Mar 2022Mar 2023Mar 2024Mar 2025Mar 2026Jun 2026
Promoters33.9%33.6%33.5%33.5%33.5%33.5%33.9%33.7%33.7%33.7%33.7%
FIIs1.1%0.5%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.6%0.9%2.3%3.8%4.1%5.8%
DIIs15.6%18.1%18.7%16.5%15.6%10.2%6.1%9.2%17.3%17.9%15.6%
Government0.0%0.3%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%
Public49.5%47.5%47.9%50.0%51.0%55.7%59.2%54.8%45.2%44.3%44.9%
No. of Shareholders20,34419,09118,69518,58117,32822,93126,13039,72343,51842,60241,365

Classifications may have changed from Sep'2022 onwards. The XBRL format added more detail from Sep'22, so sudden shifts in FII / DII can reflect reclassification rather than actual trades.

07 / Source

Documents & Filings

Every link Screener carries

All links open the original filing at BSE, ICRA or Screener. The note-level breakdown behind every line above lives in these annual reports.

Annual reports

Each PDF holds the audited financial statements, the Independent Auditor’s Report, the CARO annexure and the Board’s Report.

Credit rating rationales

ICRA’s view on the debt.

Recent announcements

Quarterly result filings

Raw PDFs behind each column of the quarterly table.

Portals & master pages

08 / Assessment

Is It Actually Cheap?

Analysis, not advice

Cheap on assets, poor on cash. Almost half the share price is a pile of financial assets, and the operating business behind it earns a decent return on the capital it uses — but it has never reliably turned profit into cash, and FY2026 is the worst example in twelve years.

What you are actually paying for

Breaking the ₹2,359 share price into its parts, on 1.13 crore shares.

Investments on the balance sheet₹1,202
Cash and equivalents₹204
less Borrowings(₹267)
Net financial assets per share₹1,139
So the market pays this for the actual business₹1,222

That is 48% of the price sitting in securities and cash. Strip the ₹41 Cr of other income out of profit and tax it at 25%, and the operating business earns about ₹79 a share — so it trades near 15.5x, not the headline 23.8x.

Why the screens look worse than the business

The ratio trap

Screener flags a 6.05% ROE and 8.37% ROCE, and lists low return on equity as a con. Both are calculated on total equity — which includes ₹1,357 Cr of investments throwing off roughly 3%. Take those out and the picture inverts: operating equity of ₹672 Cr earning ₹89 Cr is about 13% ROE, and operating capital employed of ₹742 Cr against ₹141 Cr of EBIT is roughly 19% — 30% in FY2024 and 54% in FY2025, when working capital was lean. The manufacturing business is not the problem.

The case for it

Bull

  • Half the market cap is financial assets, so the operating business is implied at ₹1,380 Cr on ₹2,274 Cr of sales.
  • Cheapest in its own peer table by a distance: 23.8x against a 33.4x median, with ABB at 103x, Siemens 97x and Hitachi Energy 125x.
  • Revenue has nearly doubled in four years, ₹1,266 Cr to ₹2,274 Cr, into a real Indian transmission and distribution upcycle.
  • Return on the capital the operations actually use is 19–30%, far above the headline.
  • No dilution in twelve years — equity capital flat at ₹6 Cr — and a 30.9% dividend payout maintained throughout.
The case against it

Bear

  • Cash conversion is the core problem. Twelve years: ₹686 Cr of reported profit, ₹385 Cr of operating cash (56%), ₹143 Cr of free cash (21%). Dividends over the same period were ₹137 Cr — so essentially every rupee of free cash went straight out.
  • Growth destroys cash. Working capital went from ₹138 Cr to ₹514 Cr in FY2026. That ₹376 Cr swing swallowed the entire year’s profit and was funded with ₹221 Cr of fresh borrowing.
  • No pricing power. OPM has never once exceeded 9% in twelve years, fell to 7% in FY2026 and 5% in Q1 FY27. Material cost climbed back to 71%, and 79% in the March quarter.
  • Earnings falling while the sector booms. TTM profit −19%, Q1 FY27 profit −29.6%. Every other company in the peer table grew profit.
  • The investment book was not earned. In FY2017 investments jumped ₹8 Cr to ₹352 Cr while reserves rose ₹379 Cr — an Ind AS fair-value step-up on legacy holdings, not cash the business generated.
  • Nothing forces the value out. Promoter holding is 33.65% and drifting down. No buyback, demerger or monetisation has been signalled.

What would settle the argument

These are the numbers that decide whether this is hidden value or a value trap. All of them are in the tables below.

Operating marginback above 9% for two straight quartersnow 5%
Cash conversion cycleback under 90 daysnow 120
CFO / Operating Profitpositive and above 80%now −31%
Debtor daysback under 75now 93
Borrowingsstop rising without a matching margin gainnow ₹301 Cr
The ₹83 Cr CWIPturning into capacity and revenueup from ₹14 Cr

How to read this. The split above is an estimate, not a fact from the filings: it assumes the investment book is worth its carrying value, taxes other income at 25%, and uses 1.13 crore shares implied by FY2026 profit and EPS. The composition of that ₹1,357 Cr matters enormously and is set out in the annual report — read it before relying on any of this. I am not a financial adviser and this is not a recommendation; it is one reading of the published numbers, and the bear column is there because it deserves equal weight.

09 / Verdict

The Critique

2.4 / 5 across nine dimensions

Everything above is the record. This is the reading of it — scored, so you can disagree with a specific line rather than the whole thing.

A decent manufacturer trapped inside a holding-company balance sheet. The business earns good returns on the capital it actually uses; it just cannot turn those returns into cash.

Revenue growthStrong

Sales nearly doubled in four years, ₹1,266 Cr to ₹2,274 Cr, into a genuine transmission and distribution upcycle. This is the one thing working without qualification.

Operating marginWeak

Has never once exceeded 9% in twelve years. Fell to 7% in FY2026 and 5% in Q1 FY27 while material cost climbed back to 71%. No pricing power in a supply-constrained boom.

Cash conversionPoor

The worst number in the file. Twelve years produced ₹686 Cr of reported profit but only ₹385 Cr of operating cash and ₹143 Cr of free cash. After ₹137 Cr of dividends, twelve years of trading left about ₹6 Cr.

Working capital controlPoor

Consumed ₹376 Cr in FY2026 alone — more than the entire year’s profit. Receivables took ₹202 Cr, inventory ₹180 Cr. Growth here actively destroys cash.

Earnings qualityWeak

A quarter of pre-tax profit is non-operating investment income. Reported profit is falling — TTM −19%, Q1 FY27 −29.6% — while every peer in its own table grew.

Capital allocationQuestionable

₹1,357 Cr sits in securities yielding roughly 3% while the operating business borrows ₹221 Cr at interest to fund its own working capital. That is a choice, and an odd one.

Balance sheetMixed

Debt is still modest in absolute terms and there has been no dilution in twelve years. But borrowings went ₹80 Cr to ₹301 Cr in a single year, and the trend matters more than the level.

Shareholder signalWeak

Promoter holding is 33.65% and has drifted down every year. No buyback, no demerger, no monetisation of the investment book has been signalled. Nothing forces the discount to close.

ValuationAttractive

Roughly 48% of the share price is net financial assets, leaving the operating business at about 15.5x against a headline 23.8x and a peer median of 33x. Cheap — but cheap for reasons listed above.

Bottom line. The bear case is not that the business is bad — it is that twelve years of profit have not become cash, and until working capital is under control, growth makes that worse rather than better. The cheapness is real; the catalyst is missing.

Scoring is a judgement, not a measurement. The numbers behind each line are in the tables above and every one of them is checkable; the scores attached to them are mine. Capital allocation at 2 is the most arguable — anyone who reads the ₹1,357 Cr investment book as a deliberate war chest rather than dead weight would mark it higher. I am not a financial adviser and none of this is a recommendation.